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Book Reviews 
FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: 
REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM. 
Karen Gross.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 
1997. Pp. X, 250. 
''IF YOU DON'T HAVE ANYTHING GOOD TO SAY .... " 
Reviewed by 
Peter A Alces** 
Upon first reading Professor Gross's Failure and Forgiveness, 
("Failure") 1 I was struck by its clarity, its candor, and its simplicity. 
Rereading the book in preparation for this review confirmed that 
the work is provocative, and focused my attention on five of the 
author's conclusions: 
1. Bankruptcy judges have very little time to spend on individ-
ual bankruptcy cases, and as case loads multiply, judges will 
have less and less time to spend on individual cases. 
2. There are debtors and there are debtors. The bankruptcy 
world would work better, at least be more aesthetically 
pleasing, if we distinguish "good" from "not so good" from 
"bad debtors." 
* Karen Gross is a professor oflaw at New York Law School. 
** Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary. 
1 KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SWTEM 74-
75 (1997) 
383 
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3. Creditors should expect no more from bankruptcy than 
what they need. 
4. Apparently unique from other areas of the law, bankruptcy 
affects people beyond the immediate parties to the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. 
5. People are fundamentally altruistic. 
I am convinced that these five points are central to Professor Gross's 
thesis. And I am equally convinced that the book does no more to 
advance the literature than throwing a pie in the face of Bill Gates 
does to advance the Luddite cause. 
Still, it was difficult shake the suspicion that there must be im-
portant points made by the book. There have to be important 
points; after all the book is 250 pages long and took the author and 
a very prestigious publisher several years to produce. Certainly so 
much talent and effort could not have been expended on a project 
that says absolutely nothing new and worthwhile. 
I was wrong. 
I shall elaborate on that conclusion in the four Parts that follow 
by first responding to Professor Gross's observations regarding the 
bankruptcy process, next considering her depiction of debtors, then 
discerning the consequences of her proposals regarding creditors, 
and finally coming to terms with the vacuity of her conception of 
community. 
I. 'WERETHEREBUTWORLDENOUGHANDTIME ... " 
The strongest chapter of Failure is Chapter 5: 'What Is Tran-
spiring in the Bankruptcy System?" Gross offers a cacophony of fig-
ures and statistics describing the bankruptcy system in terms that 
might well support careful analysis of the status quo and worthwhile 
recommendations for adjustment of current law. She tells us about 
the number of filings, the rate of increase in the number of filings,2 
and types of bankruptcy protection that debtors seek.3 She counts 
creditors and takes account of the types of claims that they bring to 
• See id. at 74, 76. 
3 See id. at 83-85. 
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the bankruptcy table.4 And she notices the type of interests affected 
by bankruptcy that the bankruptcy statistics do not notice.5 
It is never really clear what point Gross is making by her recita-
tion of bankruptcy statistics, and the conclusion of Chapter 5 offers 
little guidance: 
Owing to quantification problems, some commentators believe that 
the welfare of communities, the continuity of existing businesses, and 
the preservation of self-worth and human dignity should not be con-
sidered within the bankruptcy process. [No cite is offered in support 
of that accusation.] But the inability to measure these interests easily 
in dollars and cents does not mean that the interests lack value. In-
stead, what it demonstrates is that our existing economic model is too 
narrow. If we limit our assessment of bankruptcy's impact to money, 
we resort to a unidimensional perspective. Therefore, the felt costs of 
business bankruptcy may not be measurable in strict, neoclassical 
economic models.6 
It could be, of course, that those who consider numbers, dollars and 
cents, believe that the values Gross would champion are not meas-
urable and that these values are neither vindicated nor frustrated by 
the bankruptcy law. That is, people engage in economic activity to 
achieve economic goals, and one economic result is no more cer-
tain than another to further or frustrate self-worth and human dig-
nity. For instance, family farming may be charming, and family 
farmers may choose to make economic sacrifices to enjoy that 
unique charm; but if we ask others to subsidize that lifestyle (by 
forcing investment of economic rather than psychic assets to the 
preservation of the farm) we may well be compromising someone 
else's dream.' Bankruptcy cannot answer every question; it cannot 
make all dreams come true. It can endeavor to minimize some of 
' See id. at 79-81. 
' See id. at 81-83, 88. 
• Id. at88. 
7 Consider: 
Though the irrationality and absurdity of modem agricultural policy is perhaps 
most easily seen in the United States, we must tum to other countries if we are to 
become aware of the full extent to which such policies, systematically pursued, are 
liable to impose restrictions on the farmer (whose "sturdy independence" is at the 
same time often referred to as an argument for maintaining him at public ex-
pense) and tum him into the most regimented and supervised of all producers. 
FREDERICKA. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OFLIBERT¥362-63 (1960). 
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the economic and financial disruption caused by outrageous for-
tune or improvident choices. 
Gross's perspective demands more of bankruptcy and it is diffi-
cult to see why she would limit the scope of her agenda to the bank-
ruptcy system. Certainly she seems unconcerned with the scarce-
ness of resources, though she notes that 
At a 95% level of statistical reliability, business Chapter 7 cases occu-
pied 40 minutes per case of judicial time, whereas nonbusiness Chap-
ter 7 cases occupied 10 minutes of time per case. On average, judges 
spent 38 minutes on each Chapter 13 case. Judges spent on average 
456 minutes [seven and one-half hours] on each Chapter 11 case, 
with the amount of time increasing with the size of the case. 8 
So whatever Professor Gross has in mind for the bankruptcy system, 
she will have to work her proposals into those time constraints or 
fmd a way to attract more judicial resources, as well as the means to 
pay for them, without sacrificing anything that she might find 
worthwhile in the current system. 
But it is not even at all clear that Gross really understands the 
very figures she recites. After offering the foregoing delineation of 
judicial time spent on different types of bankruptcy cases, she iden-
tifies what she apparently perceives to be an anomaly: "In simple 
terms, the greatest amount of judicial time is spent on cases that 
constitute the smallest percentage of filed cases-the mega chapter 
II cases. "9 She seems to ignore the fact that those mega chapter II 
cases may well have the greatest effect on the community interests 
that she would champion. That is, the statistics she uses to demon-
strate judicial inattention to the interests of individuals may estab-
lish, were she to look a bit further, that courts do spend the most 
time on the cases that directly and indirectly affect the most people. 
Notwithstanding her curious catalog and reading of the statis-
tics she amassed, Gross's arithmetic conclusion regarding the 
amount of time judges can spend on cases is helpful. It provides the 
frame of reference to consider her conclusions about bankruptcy 
debtors, creditors, and the impact that bankruptcy has on commu-
nity. 
8 GROSS, supra note 1, at 132. 
9 Id. 
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II. DEBTOR EQUITY 
Despite what the Bible says about stealing, a Church of England priest 
suggested today it is no sin to shoplift-as long as the victim is a big 
supermarket. . . . [The cleric] drew a distinction between stealing 
from individuals or small merchants-which he said is wrong-and 
stealing from giant retailing corporations. Those, he said, have run 
little stores out of business and harmed local communities .... The 
Church of England distanced itself from [the cleric], and others 
. . d. 10 JOine m. 
Professor Gross places debtors on a culpability scale and then 
describes how debtor culpability might inform the sum and sub-
stance of the bankruptcy law. Her conclusion is that debtors need 
forgiveness; in fact, forgiveness is "[T]he solution to the problem of 
nonpaying debtors." 11 I am in favor of forgiveness. I seek it often 
and am also pleased to find it; occasionally I forgive. (I've even been 
known to forget.) But Professor Gross fails to come to terms with 
the incentives for strategic behavior that her focus on forgiveness 
invites, and she paints the points on her culpability scale in the sim-
plistic primary colors that ignore the shades of grey that more accu-
rately would capture real debtors and their debts. Sure it would be 
great if we could all forgive and be forgiven without any undesirable 
consequences. But life, and certainly bankruptcy life, is too often a 
zero sum game and forgiveness comes at a cost. Further, even were 
we sure that forgiveness is the answer, Gross acknowledges that for-
giveness must be deserved. How are we to determine who is deserv-
ing and at what cost? Gross posits a myopic continuum: 
Suppose that each of five farmers borrowed money from the 
bank to buy seed for the next crop. The farmers and the bank an-
ticipated that the crop revenues would be sufficient to service this 
short-term borrowing. Come time to repay, however, none of the five 
farmers had sufficient funds. The reasons why they could not repay 
are very different. 
First Farmer planted his seed, but his fields were hit by a plague 
of locusts, destroying the crop. The money to repay the bank never 
10 English Priest Stirs Up A Storm By justifying Some Shoplifting, WASH. Posr, 
Mar. 16, 1997, atA28. 
n GROSS, supra note 1, at 93. 
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materialized. Second Farmer also planted his seed. As it was grow-
ing, he decided to purchase a new machine that was supposed to 
make harvesting less expensive by decreasing the amount of neces-
sary labor. Unfortunately, the machine did not function faster than 
manual harvesting, as Second Farmer had hoped. Had Second 
Farmer thoroughly investigated the machine, he would have learned 
that it had not been fully tested. Because the machine failed, Second 
Farmer's crop was delayed getting to market, and the crop yielded 
less revenue than he needed to repay his debt. Third Farmer 
planted, harvested, and sold his crop. Rather than repay the bank, 
however, he used the money to repay some of his other creditors, 
who were hounding him. Fourth Farmer planted his seed and har-
vested his crop, and he had sufficient revenues. But on the way to 
the bank, he bumped into a group of old friends, and they sat down 
together to play some cards. Fourth Farmer lost all his money. Fi-
nally, Fifth Farmer, unlike the other farmers, never purchased the 
seed. Instead, he took the proceeds of the bank loan and used them 
to purchase a new luxury automobile and take a cruise to the Baha-
12 mas. In the end, he, too, had no money to repay the bank. 
Professor Gross follows that hypothetical with her own conclusions 
regarding the culpability of each of the farmers and the impact of 
their relative culpability on their claims to forgiveness. 13 The First 
Farmer is least culpable (most deserving of forgiveness, "discharge" 
in bankruptcy parlance) and the Fifth Farmer the most culpable, 
least deserving. She would forgive more readily the less blamewor-
thy and thereby create incentives for people to be less blameworthy. 
Of course, Professor Gross's hypotheticals are so simplistic as to 
be essentially useless given her aspirations for the bankruptcy sys-
tem. The venal do not always appear so obviously so and the differ-
ence between the well meaning but ignorant and the careless is not 
always so easily discerned. It would not be responsive for her to ar-
gue that the hypotheticals are only designed to describe in summary 
terms the nature of her forgiveness calculus. Facts are hard (and 
expensive) to find, and her construction depends on the reliable 
determination of facts. Further, her framework assumes that all 
people will respond to forgiveness the same way ("people are in-
herently decent,"14 whatever that might mean), that blameless third 
" Id. at 105-06. 
" See id. at 106-08. 
" Id. at. 109. 
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parties will not be affected by a decision not to forgive the debtor. 15 
In Professor Gross's world of forgiveness, would we really want to 
punish, refuse to forgive Fifth Farmer, if he is the sole source of 
support for an invalid child who is unable to care for herself?; could 
we ignore the fact that First Farmer has a criminal record and a his-
tory of embezzlement and does not have any dependents that rely 
on him? 
In the real bankruptcy world we choose to ignore a good deal 
that would complicate a forgiveness calculus. But do we ignore 
complicating facts because we are not concerned with social reality? 
No. We ignore them in bankruptcy because there is only so much 
we can do in bankruptcy. We cannot determine who is deserving of 
forgiveness. It is ludicrous, presumptuous, and even arrogant to be-
lieve that we could. That is not to say that the world would not be a 
more beautiful place if only the deserving were forgiven, and for-
given in the right measure. Bankruptcy, though, has no business 
trying to do what our philosophical, theological, and general nor-
mative inquiries have failed to do. Gross is more confident of her 
philosophical and psychological acumen than I can be about any-
one's wisdom.16 
In the Code's bar to discharge provisions, bankruptcy already 
takes into account some of the culpability indicia that Gross would 
utilize.17 Granted, the Code does the cutting with a hatchet rather 
than a scalpel. But, if anything, the bankruptcy law should do less 
rather than more to further social policies unrelated to economic 
distress. The Code already looks too much like the Internal Reve-
nue Code. I would argue that the Bankruptcy Code should not try 
to be the social engineering catastrophe that the IRC has become. 
Perhaps we need a normatively flat Code as some would argue that 
we need a flat tax. And that is not because it would be undesirable 
to have bankruptcy do some equity. That is because the cost of its 
doing equity, and probably doing it badly in the knee jerk way Gross 
contemplates, would be both prohibitively expensive and ultimately 
foolish. 
" Professor Gross does make the point that "some debtors cannot be rehabilitated so 
they should not be forgiven." Id. at 104. We can imagine that loan applications would need 
to include a line on which the borrower describes her capacity for rehabilitation. 
•• Id. at 108-11. 
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 & 727 (1994). 
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Bankruptcy law, like all law, is to an extent about finding out 
what we can afford to find out. Professor Gross has no sense of the 
limits of the possible, and reflects that nonsense in the very same 
text in which she reproduces figures describing the very few minutes 
that bankruptcy judges have to spend on cases.18 Further, why 
would we want (largely affluent and insulated) bankruptcy judges to 
make normative judgments they have no particular training or ex-
pertise to make, even if there were enough time and resources? 
Another phase of the same type of fundamental error emerges 
when Professor Gross takes on corporate law by attacking the lim-
ited liability system. The normative vacuity of limited liability is not 
much of a discovery. It does not take much moral sense to realize 
that those who do not have to answer for their failures will fail more 
often. Ifyou can use someone else's money, you will gamble more 
and be less risk averse. That circumstance is only exacerbated when 
you can gamble with someone else's money, keep the winnings for 
yourself, and leave the losses on your benefactor. The attack on the 
limited liability doctrine can be made, but must be made in a 
thoughtful, deliberate manner. The legal literature is not much ad-
vanced by attacking the excesses of the doctrine without taking into 
account the economic consequences of doing so. 
Failure concludes that limited liability makes good sense in 
many nonbankruptcy contexts. But it produces a wide range of 
anomalous results within the bankruptcy system that lead to con-
cern over whether it should be fully retained in that context. Be-
cause limited liability is clearly a matter of state law, one must ask 
whether federal law (that is, bankruptcy) should take precedence 
over state law, thereby curtailing limited liability for corporate offi-
cers, directors, and shareholders.19 
Of course it is in bankruptcy that limited liability most matters. 
It is striking that a law professor could conclude that limited liability 
should be abrogated in the case where the officers, directors, and 
shareholders would most want to rely on their liability's being lim-
ited-when the firm fails-and not take into account, not even try 
to imagine, the consequences of abrogating limited liability in that 
setting. To abrogate limited liability in bankruptcy, where it argua-
bly matters most, is essentially to abrogate limited liability alto-
18 See GROSS, supra note 1, at 132. 
•• Id. at 126. 
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gether. If Professor Gross wants to make that argument, she must at 
least consider the case that can be made for limited liability. It is 
simply not responsible to ignore the incentives that her proposal 
would create and the consequences of her proposal in economic 
terms. 
The commentator's "analysis" is not sophisticated. While she 
acknowledges that "[t]his approach [abrogation of limited liability] 
has its downsides" and the "[i]ndividuals could be deterred from 
serving as officers or directors of corporate entities[,]" she rejoins 
that "individuals now continue to serve despite fiduciary tax liability 
or even environmental claims."20 Is she really unable to appreciate 
the difference between fiduciary tax and environmental liability and 
the potential liability for all tort and contract claims assertable 
against a corporate debtor? Does it make any sense to posit per-
sonal liability of corporate shareholders without considering the na-
ture of shareholder involvement? Should I be personally liable for 
the contract and tort liability of every company whose stock is held 
by a mutual fund in which I invest? 
III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR CREDITORS OR HOW TO MAKE BIG 
CREDITORS SMALL CREDITORS 
GEORGE BAILEY: You're thinking of this place all wrong, as if I've 
got the money back in a safe. The money's not here. Well your 
money's in Joe's house; that's right next to yours and the Kennedy 
house and a hundred others. You're lending them the money to 
build and then they are going to pay you back as best they can. Now 
what are you going to do? Foreclose on them? 
TOM: I've got $242 in here and $242 isn't going to break anybody. 
MARY [waving a wad of cash ... ]: How much do you need?! 
GEORGE: I've got $2000. Here's $2000. That will tide us over until 
the bank reopens. Alright. 
TOM: how much do you need? 
TOM:$242. 
GEORGE: Ah Tom, just enough to tide you over 'til the bank re-
opens. 
TOM: I'll take $242. 
GEORGE: There you are. 
"' Id. at 127. 
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MAN: I've got $300, George. 
GEORGE: What'll it take 'til the bank opens? 
MAN: Well, I suppose $20. 
[Vol. 15 
GEORGE: $20. Now you're talkin'. Now, Mrs. Compton, how much 
do you want? 
MRS. COMPTON: But it's your money, George. 
GEORGE: Never mind about that. Now, how much do you want? 
MRS. COMPTON: I can get along with $20. Alright. 
GEORGE: $20, fine. 
MRS. COMPTON: And I'll sign a paper. 
GEORGE: You don't need to sign anything. I know, you pay it when 
you can. Hi Miss Davis. 
MISS DAVIS: Can I have $17.50? 
GEORGE: Bless your heart. Of course you can have it. 21 
Professor Gross begins her discussion of the treatment of credi-
tors in bankruptcy by distinguishing equality of treatment from 
equality of outcome, and she pursues the distinction for many more 
pages than are necessary to make the point that a loss of $5000 to 
me is more significant, in some way, than would be the loss of $5000 
to Microsoft. So if we both lose that amount, we have been treated 
equally but have experienced unequal outcomes. 22 On that certainly 
accurate premise, Gross rests her conclusion that bankruptcy should 
take into account the impact bankruptcy will have on a particular 
creditor (though not those dependent on the creditor?) in deciding 
how much a creditor should realize from the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. This leads her to champion the cause of "small" creditors over 
that of larger creditors. 
To some extent the distinction that she draws is already vindi-
cated in the priority provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 23 but once 
again Gross would go further in her quest for equality than does the 
current law: 
Under [her proposal], any unsecured creditor, large or small in ei-
ther size of entity or amount owed, could challenge the standard pro 
rata distribution as it applied to him or her. The distribution system 
would continue to operate based on equality of treatment (subject to 
" IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946). 
22 See GROSS, supra note 1, at 13844. 
23 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994). 
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the more elaborate understanding of equal treatment with separate 
classification and payouts), but a creditor could rebut the presump-
tion of equal treatment upon a showing of irreparable iJ:Uury. A re-
buttal would then enable the creditor to recover based on equality of 
outcome rather than equality of treatment.24 
Irreparably injured creditors would receive a priority. Profes-
sor Gross offers examples of sufficiently irreparable injury: 
"imminent collapse of a business, mortgage foreclosure on the 
creditor's home, or inability to acquire needed medical care."25 She 
again offers a sliding scale of irreparable injury26 and reaches con-
clusions about the creditors' relative worthiness.27 That "analysis" is 
no more convincing than it was when Gross compared debtors' rela-
tive forgiveness-worthiness. There is no reason to re-engage her on 
essentially the same front. 
More interesting is Professor Gross's consideration of the way 
that her scheme would have an impact on transactors' strategic be-
havior. 
At first glance, it seems that creditors as a whole would be disinclined 
to adopt this suggested approach, particularly as one or more credi-
tors could obtain greater distribution than others and receive it ear-
" GROSS, supra note I, at 165. 
" Id. 
,. Suppose four creditors each lent Smythe one thousand dollars. They all seek to 
rebut the presumption. First Creditor, a good friend, wants to be repaid so she can 
buy luxury goods for herself. Had she not lent Smythe the money (or had she 
been repaid), she would have been able to make such purchases, having saved and 
invested prudently. Second Creditor is Smythe's next door neighbor. Since the 
loan, her spouse has become very ill, and without obtaining repayment or taking 
out a home equity loan, she cannot put food on the table. Third Creditor is 
Smythe's co-worker. A profligate spender, he needs to be repaid so he can pay his 
own rent because he has no savings. Fourth Creditor is a finance company that had 
mailed Smythe a credit application, which it subsequently approved without much 
investigation. 
Id. at 165-66. 
" Distinguishing among these creditors is hard and can be done only through a 
subjective assessment. With that caveat, an argument can be proffered that only 
Second Creditor and Third Creditor will suffer irreparable harm if they are not re-
paid. Although one may not feel badly [sic] for Fourth Creditor, First Creditor 
evokes sympathy-but not enough to rebut the presumption. 
Id. at 166 (emphasis added). (Perhaps I date myself, and reveal something embarrassing 
about my early television viewing habits, but does that type of pathos meter sound a little bit 
like "Queen for a Day"?). 
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lier to boot. But creditors could be convinced of the merits of the sys-
tem. First, some creditors are willing to look beyond their own self-
interest. Moreover, creditors may appreciate the concept of the re-
buttable presumption because it would be available to them if they 
needed it prospectively. Additionally, if creditors were aware of the 
possibility that a limited pool of creditors would receive preferential 
treatment, they could factor this into the initial assessment of 
whether to do business with the debtor and at what price.28 
Her statement is ludicrous. Put aside the fact that there are real dis-
incentives for investing in businesses that "look beyond their own 
self-interest" in the amorphous sense that Gross seems to have in 
mind and concentrate on her observation that creditors would price 
the financial extremis of their debtors' other creditors into the 
prices they charge those debtors. Would there be a question on 
loan applications such as: "List all of your current and potential fu-
ture creditors and offer an assessment of the impact of your finan-
cial failure on their financial condition. Attach a separate sheet if 
necessary"? It is impossible to imagine the deleterious effects that 
Gross's proposal would have on the cost of credit. This proposal, 
just like the discharge proposal, would introduce fatal uncertainty 
into the economy, complicating if not confounding any pricing 
mechanism, and destroying the fundamental assumptions that sup-
port our fmancial system. Perhaps I exaggerate, but not much. 
The reductio ad absurdum of Professor Gross's rebuttable pre-
sumption proposal is captured in her conclusion that 
Large creditors, unlike many small ones, do have the capacity to re-
coup losses by passing them onto others [employees, consumers, and 
small creditors?] and withstanding the lag time between the loss and 
the recoupment. And unlike many small community-based busi-
nesses, large businesses can decide not to extend unsecured credit in 
large amounts. Because large creditors have these options, it is easier 
to foist more burdens on them, reallocating loss from unstable busi-
ness to more stable ones [and making the stable ones unstable too?] 29 
This conclusion rises to the level of irresponsible scholarship be-
cause Gross fails to thoughtfully work through the ramifications of 
her scheme. Frankly, it would be more coherent, but no more re-
" Id.at 167. 
,. Id. at 175. 
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sponsible, for her to argue that the United States Treasury should 
simply print whatever amount of money is necessary to avoid any-
thing less than one hundred cents on the dollar payoffs in bank-
ruptcy. In fact, it might well be that the deleterious impact of that 
suggestion would be less extreme than the consequences of the ar-
gument in Gross's Failure. 
As in the Debtors section of her book, Professor Gross does not 
advance the literature in the Creditors section. The world she imag-
ines has no "reality referent" and her efforts to posit facts that would 
accommodate her analysis are incomplete and fundamentally 
flawed. She takes into account some of the incentives to which her 
proposals would give rise but describes their operation incom-
pletely, ignoring cost and simply imagining that, somehow, her 
proposal would create wealth. In fact, it is probably more likely that 
her adjustment of the bankruptcy law would destroy wealth and re-
duce welfare (at the expense of society's most destitute) by under-
mining certainty in commercial transactions and increasing fact 
finding costs exponentially. 
IV. COMMUNITY: WHAT A WONDERFUL DAY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD 
One cannot be a propagandist in the service of truth or an advocate 
in the service of justice, for the character and the motives are wrong. 
And character and motive are for these purposes everything, for 
'truth' and 'justice' are not abstract absolutes, to be attained or not in 
materially measurable ways; these are words that define shared mo-
tives out of which a community and a culture can be built and a char-
acter made for the individual and his world. They express an atti-
tude, imply a process, and promise a community.30 
"Mercy to a criminal may be gross injustice to the community. ,3t 
Professor Gross's arguments concerning the validation of 
community interests in bankruptcy is the crescendo toward which 
the first nearly two hundred pages of her book builds. At the outset 
of Part IV she asks the question: ''What is meant by community?"32 
"' JAMES BOYD WHITE, A Dialogue on Ethics, HERACLES' Bow: EssA)S ON THE RHETORIC 
ANDPOETICSOFTHEI..AW221 (1985). 
u Scott Wav~ xxxii (1814). OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY, Vol. ill, p. 582. 
" GROSS, supra note I, at 193. 
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And, best as I can tell, she never provides a worthwhile definition of 
the term. It would seem to me that community is what we mean by 
the sum total of pooled individual interests. There is no alchemy by 
which the whole is somehow normatively greater than the sum of its 
parts. Indeed, in some responsible philosophies, the individual may 
be more important than the community, in significant ways. There 
is a distributive power generated by interdependent individuals; 
conscientious pursuit of self-interest, broadly (and correctly) de-
fined may well do more to assure the greater welfare than any more 
awkward and intrusive efforts at social engineering in the name of 
"community." 
But Professor Gross ignores Adam Smith's invisible hand and 
waxes poetic about terms that she never stops to define. In arguing 
for small town squares over less personal shopping malls she ob-
serves that "[a]lthough pleasantness of surroundings is not com-
monly factored into the traditional neoclassical economic model, 
the long-term consequences of human unhappiness with a place are 
not insignificant. "33 I have no idea what support could possibly be 
offered for the assertion that the neoclassical economic model takes 
no account of "pleasantness of surroundings." People go to malls, 
spend money in malls, and earn money in malls because such places 
are pleasant, more pleasant, at least in an economic sense because 
they are more convenient, than the alternative village squares. If 
that were not so, the malls would be ghost towns and every suburb 
would have a vibrant downtown. Economics can explain why peo-
ple go to malls, why people (in the aggregate) prefer malls to down-
town storefronts, but economics does not rely on indeterminate 
conceptions such as "pleasantness" to explain why people shop at 
malls. That does not mean that economics takes no account of 
pleasantness. Economics merely uses less subjective and more com-
prehensible terminology than words such as "pleasant." 
To support her conclusion that people care about community 
for the sake of community (and not as the sum of their individual 
interests), Gross posits the foundation of her philosophy: "[A] t their 
core, people are altruistic and are willing to forgo certain self-
interests to accomplish larger goals."34 She anticipates the reflex re-
sponse to her bald and obviously unsupportable conclusion: 
" Id. at 199. 
" Id. at200. 
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[u]ltimately, I am no more able to prove that people are inherently 
good than detractors will be able to prove that people are inherently 
bad. All I can hope to demonstrate is that the picture is not as bleak 
as some imagine it to be.35 
First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to say that people 
are "all good." All people are likely a combination of things that 
some people would consider good and other people would consider 
not so good or even bad. Second, the "detractors" Gross refers to 
would likely not say that people are all bad just because people act 
in their own self interest. That is not bad; it is just human. Third, if 
by "bad" Gross does mean selfish, then her "detractors" would be 
able to prove that they are more right than Gross by pointing to the 
great predictive value of microeconomics, which is based on the as-
sumption that people act in their own self-interest. 
It would be tempting to beat that horse further, but ultimately 
the exercise would generate more heat than light. It is probably 
more worthwhile to tum to a consideration of Professor Gross's 
specific proposal for explicitly including community interest into 
the bankruptcy calculus. She would adjust the chapter 11 Reorgani-
zation law to provide that "[t]he court shall confirm a plan if ... 
[t]he plan takes the interests of community into account unless the 
balance of equities clearly favors denial of these interests." She 
would define "community" as "those persons, including the gov-
ernment, with a nexus with the debtor for whom (1) there is sub-
stantial injury caused by the bankruptcy filing and (2) that injury is 
redressable through the reorganization process. "36 That proposal 
seems vacuous to me, and I do not mean merely that it is ineffica-
cious or would do little or no good. I mean that it would do incal-
culable harm because it would require a bankruptcy court to engage 
in an exercise akin to calculating the number of angels that can 
dance on the head of a pin. Why not just enjoin the bankruptcy 
court to "do the right thing, all things considered." 
I have no doubt that Professor Gross believes that she could 
make such a calculation, and with great certainty. She demonstrates 
no reticence about coming to terms, in chauvinistic fashion, with 
life's fundamental mysteries in ways that she deems supportive of 
her communitarian view. For example, she states that: "people who 
" Id. 
"' Id. at 228-29. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Bankr. Dev. J.  398 1998-1999
398 BANKRUPTCYDEVELOPMENTSjOURNAL [Vol. 15 
are married experience a different kind of commitment from those 
who are unmarried."37 That assertion is probably preposterous and 
certainly useless and does not deserve to be taken seriously on its 
own merits, much less as an argument in favor of taking community 
interest into account. Gross's brand of pseudo-science, psychology, 
and philosophy is the foundation of Failure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In her preface to the soft-cover edition of Failure, Professor 
Gross notes that in the bankruptcy debate, the running dialogue 
about the essential values that a bankruptcy system should vindicate, 
lines have been drawn and even ad hominem attacks have begun to 
surface. If she is right about the tenor of the debate, and I have no 
reason to question her observations in that regard, that is unfortu-
nate. The tone of this review has been derisive and I acknowledge 
that. But my attack is on Failure, not on Karen Gross. She is a fine 
person, who, from what I can tell, takes her job seriously and does 
the best she can to contribute to the literature. My conclusion that 
Failure is a failure is not a conclusion that Professor Gross cannot 
make important contributions as a teacher and commentator on the 
bankruptcy law. I have seen her make fine presentations that reveal 
a keen sense of the Supreme Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence. 
I am troubled by the fact that Failure does not seem to me to 
be responsible scholarship. The commercial law (including the 
bankruptcy law) is too often belittled in favor of more "prestigious" 
legal subjects. That is unfortunate. A book about bankruptcy, pub-
lished by the Yale University Press, that endeavors to be accessible to 
lay people should be thoughtful, should anticipate the difficult 
questions that engaged readers would ask, and should offer re-
sponses. Failure does not do any of that, in any but the most super-
ficial terms. The book falls back on words that have emotional cur-
rency, "altruism," for instance, but which the law cannot afford to 
treat in the superficial, facile manner of day time talk shows. 
I must make clear, however, that I am not troubled by Professor 
Gross's aspirations for the bankruptcy law (and the world, for that 
matter). I agree it would be wonderful if every debtor received his 
just desserts and were perfectly happy with that. In fact, were that 
possible, I can see no reason for limiting that result to the bank-
"' Id.at230. 
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ruptcy courts. In a way, Professor Gross is not ambitious enough, 
why not extend her argument to all dispute resolution fora? 
Wouldn't the world be a better place if we could always, in every le-
gal setting, irrespective of the financial extremis of one of the par-
ties, distribute resources in the most "fair" way? In a world of per-
fect justice, those of us who do not know what is just would be 
enlightened and there would be no waste. VCRs would even be easy 
to program and no one would ever need exact change. 
That goal, perfect justice, is not realizable because we could 
never reach consensus on what perfect justice is any more than we 
could agree on what "community" or "culpability" means. Professor 
Gross's book fails because she ignores the limits of the possible. We 
do not all live in Bedford Falls; but we do not live in Potterville ei-
ther. We live where we live and we can afford to do what we can af-
ford to do. A book that recognizes the limits of the possible would 
be much more worthwhile than a road map of George Bailey's 
hometown. 
We have the right to expect more serious scholarship than 
Failure delivers, and that is the pity. The work has received much 
more attention than it deserves; we should move on. 
